In this essay we will discuss about the history of Indian agriculture during different periods. After reading this essay you will learn about:- 1. Introduction to the History of Indian Agriculture during Different Periods 2. Indian Agriculture Before 1860 3. Indian Agriculture during 1860—1880 4. The American Civil War 5. The Opening of the Suez Canal 6. Indian Agriculture during 1880—1895 and Other Details.
List of Essays on the History of Indian Agriculture during Different Periods
Essay Contents:
- Essay on the Introduction to the History of Indian Agriculture during Different Periods
- Essay on Indian Agriculture Before 1860
- Essay on Indian Agriculture during 1860—1880
- Essay on the American Civil War
- Essay on the Opening of the Suez Canal
- Essay on Indian Agriculture during 1880 – 1895
- Essay on Indian Agriculture during 1896—1914
- Essay on Indian Agriculture during the First World War and After
- Essay on Indian Agriculture and the Depression
- Essay on Indian Agriculture during the Second World War
- Essay on Indian Agriculture during the Partition
- Essay on Agriculture under the Plans
Essay # 1. Introduction to the History of Indian Agriculture during Different Periods:
The theories of underdevelopment which emphasize the shortage of factors of production as the primary explanation generally follow the traditional grouping of factors of production under four heads : Land, labour. Capital and organisation or ‘entrepreneurship.
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We are concerned with land; more specifically, we are concerned with the way in which agriculture in India failed to respond to the demands for raw-materials and food generated by the limited development of industry and the increase of population. This can be best understood by a study of the history of Indian Agriculture.
Essay # 2.
Indian Agriculture during Before 1860:
Prior to 1860, India was, as it is today, a predominantly agricultural country. A vast majority of its population derived its livelihood from land. Agricultural, however, was organised on the basis of the self-sufficiency of the village.
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The principal crops grown, apart from wheat in the north and rice in the south, were oil-seeds, cotton and sugar cane. These were either consumed at home or in the village itself. As cotton and sugar-cane depend on the nature of the soil and the availability of irrigation facilities, there was a certain degree of localisation in these crops.
According to Dr. Mann, “In the pre-British days and in the early days of the British Rule, the holdings were usually of a fair size, frequently more than 9—10 acres while individual holdings of less than 2 acres were hardly known” But the increase in population and the decline of the village industries mounted the pressure on land leading to its sub-division and fragmentation.
As a result, holdings became small, the average holding of 41 acres in 1771 having been reduced to mere 14 acres between 1820—1840. This is confirmed by Dr. Buchanan who found that in the south, each farm generally consisted of 2—3 ploughs of land.
Large farmers, however, owned 4—5 ploughs and cultivated about 12 ½ acres of wet and 25 acres of dry land. In the north, a majority of holdings were between 5—10 acres in size; holdings of 55 acres were considered very large.
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Agriculture, then as now, was a ‘gamble in rains’. The failure of rains meant a sure famine. Means of artificial irrigation like canals and tanks were few. Sir Elphinstone found in the Khandesh District of Bombay “the dilapidated remains of more than one hundred substantially built dams for diverting the water into channels for irrigation, many of which constructed at prodigious expense.”
Similarly, Dr. Buchanan found, in the course of his journey in the South, numerous large reservoirs, built by ancient kings, which could be of immense value on a country liable to famine.
These ancient works lay neglected but could have been repaired and put to use. However, the East India Company was not prepared to commit itself to any extensive scheme of state irrigation. In the world of Sir Arthur Cotton, its policy was “to do nothing, have nothing done…”
All that the company did was to repair or remodel the Eastern and Western Jamuna canals, the Cauvery works and the construction of the Ganges canal and the Godavari works, most of them towards the closing years of this period.
Under such conditions, naturally no effort was made at improving agriculture. The methods of cultivation were old and primitive. Implements were few and, over wide areas, practically the only mechanical aid to cultivation was the plough.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the productivity of land declined. Dr. Mukerjee found that the average yield of wheat which stood at 1550 pounds in Akbar’s time had fallen to 1000 pounds for irrigated and 620 pounds for non-irrigated land in 1827—1840. In areas, where the soil was poor and irrigation scanty, the return per acre could be as low as six bushels of rice.
Even at these low levels of productivity, there was no general impulse in the farming community towards improving agricultural practices. The blame lay with the new land tenure systems introduced with the permanent settlement of Bengal in 1793. The new land systems separated agricultural Capital from Labour engaged in the cultivation of land. This had a most adverse effect on production.
The one class, the new landed aristocracy, which could invest in land, found money-lending and acquisition of agricultural property more paying. It, therefore, did not interest itself in improving land or agricultural equipment.
Nor did the government, which raised the bulk of its revenues from this source, help agriculture beyond establishing Botanical Gardens or providing assistance to the few Horticultural Societies. As regards the tiller, rack-renting and exorbitant interest charges not only impoverished him but also destroyed all his incentive for progress.
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According to Dr. Buchanan, an other cause of the poor crops in many parts of India was the custom of forcing land upon people who had no means of cultivating it, while the company could maximise its revenue receipts in this manner, and that indeed was its objective, the tiller did not have the resources to cultivate it properly.
The yield per acre was bound to be low. Otherwise, a desirable effect of this policy of loading a ryot with a holding on which he had to pay revenue, was to force him to till more land than he might have done otherwise. This extension of the area under cultivation was indeed necessary in view of the growth of population and its increasing pressure on land.
Declining productivity of land but increasing population combined to cause scarcities and famines which frequently visited the country. In a period of 90 years, from 1765 to 1858, the country suffered twelve famines and four ‘severe’ scarcities.
Of these, the famine of 1770 ‘wasted Bengal in a manner dreadful beyond all example’, claiming, as it did, 50% of the agricultural and 35% of the entire population of the province.
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The overall effect, according to Thompson and Garret, was to depress the economic condition of the people. Of course, there were wide differences. In the Bombay Deccan, the ordinary peasant was almost as well off as his counter-part in England. But in Bengal, the permanent Settlement failed to protect the small peasant from the exactions of the Zamindars.
In Madras presidency, the peasantry was far from prosperous mainly due to the very heavy land revenue demand. In other parts of the country, apart from frequent wars, the depredations of the robbers, the diversion of the revenue from possible local improvements to purchase of company’s ‘investments’, the heavy revenue assessments, collected rigidly and promptly, left the country poor and her people thoroughly impoverished.
Under these circumstances, the poor peasant, who lived just on the level of subsistence and even below, could not avoid seeking the help of the money-lender. Munro in Madras and Elphinstone in Bombay found, at the beginning of the 19 country, how utterly sunk in debt the ryot was.
The money lender maintained the farmer from crop to crop and got, in return, the whole of the surplus produce as payment of interest. As for the payment of the principal, it never entered the poor peasants’ head.
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As a matter of fact, the extension of the company’s rule meant the end of wars and disturbances. The establishment of peace should have promoted progress and development of agriculture. But the new land systems and the crushing revenue assessments, both parts of a grand design, made the condition of the people one of hopeless poverty.
Essay # 3. Indian Agriculture during 1860—1880:
The period of 20 years, 1860—1880, although one of great agricultural distress, was also the most important in breaking India’s economic isolation and commercializing her agriculture. It was during this period that the foundations of the new commerce and industry were laid and modern means of communications and transport provided which were to profoundly influence the course of her future economic development.
Two events in the western world had far reaching consequences for India. One was the American Civil war in 1861—65.
Essay # 4. The American Civil War:
Although cotton had been grown in India from very early times, it was not exported in any large quantity. India mostly grew short-staple cotton while the British manufacturers preferred the long-staple variety. Also, Indian cotton was not properly cleaned and it contained an enormous admixture of dirt.
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Besides, before the construction of the Suez canal, transport between India and England was difficult, lengthy as well as costly. There was, therefore, no incentive to produce and export cotton of high quality.
Then came the American Civil war; the ports of south America were closed and there was a virtual cotton famine in Lancashire. The machines, however, had to be kept moving. It was then that England turned to India for meeting her needs.
The effects of this sudden increase in demand were enormous. The quantity exported to England rose from 5 lakh bales in 1859 to 13.5 lakh bales in 1864 —an increase of more than 2½ times in four years. This spectacular increase in demand pushed up the cotton prices which rose by more than four time from about 15 paise per pound in 1859 to about 69 Paise a Pound in 1864.
The increase in the quantity exported combined with the rise in prices made the value of cotton exports formidable. In 1859 — 60, India exported raw-cotton worth Rs.5.6 crores; in 1864—65, the value of cotton exports had risen to Rs.37.5 crores—an increase of more than six times.
The significance of this increase may be understood from the fact that, for a few years after 1864, the value of cotton exports formed more than half the value of total exports from India.
Large demand and high prices pushed up the area under cotton cultivation. The Govt. herself showed keen interest in the extension of cotton cultivation. Cotton Commissioners were appointed for Bombay and Central Provinces. In the North Western Provinces, Mr. Saunders was appointed to enquire, among other things, into the cultivation of cotton.
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There was a proposal for “the establishment of the Departments of Agriculture in each of the several provinces of India and the more active employment of collectors in matters connected with cotton cultivation”. The result was that, in the central provinces alone, the area almost doubled from 3.75 lakh acres in 1861—62 to 6.91 lakh acres in 1864—65.
The great increase in the demand for and the prices of raw-cotton brought unprecedented prosperity to the cotton growing areas. In Madras “the ryots in a single district of Bellary made 1½ million Sterling by the sale of cotton in the years of the American war.”
In the Bombay Presidency, the Deccan Riots Commission found that “the abnormal value of the produce made the scanty crop of a year of drought equal to the full crop of a good season.” The new found wealth enabled all those, who were not utterly reckless, to free themselves from the clutches of the moneylender.
However, it may be noted that this prosperity was mostly confined to the commercial classes in the port towns and inland commercial centres, inland dealers, landlords and money-lenders. It, however, failed to benefit the larger section of the rural population comprising the small cultivators, the artisans, and the field labourers.
A temporary period of prosperity apart, the American Civil War led to certain unfavorable consequences. Firstly, exports of cotton brought, in exchange, heavy imports of gold and silver. The imported silver mostly found its way to the mints leading to an increase in the money-supply in the country.
Secondly, the higher prices obtainable for cotton led to its substitution for food crops thereby creating greater food shortage in the provinces of Bombay, C.P., and Madras. That is the reason why food prices showed a greater rise in these provinces than in the rest of the country.
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Thirdly, the increase in the market demand for cotton and the rise in its prices raised the value of agricultural land in the cotton growing areas. This brought into the village a new class of rural capitalists who were prepared to make advances on the security of land and crops. Thus started the movement of a gradual transference of land from the hands of the original cultivators to the money lender.
Fourthly, the period of prosperity brought by the American Civil War coincided with the period of the revision of land revenue assessments. The revenue Officers, taking the war-time high profits as the average, raised the revenue assessments so that when the period of prosperity was over, the ryot found it difficult to pay and was often obliged to raise loans for the purpose.
Lastly, the American Civil War brought sudden but short-lived prosperity. The false hope of its continuation made the ryots reckless. Money easily got was easily spent. In some cases, the cultivators, on account of their high credit, increased their liabilities. So, when the bubble burst and the prosperity vanished, the ryots found themselves caught, more than ever before, in the clutches of the money lender.
All in all, the significance of the American Civil War to India lay not so much in raising the price of cotton and thereby bringing about a short-lived prosperity. Its real importance lay in emphasising the fact that factors, other than the local needs, had begun to affect the nature and extent of the crops grown in the country.
In the words of Gadgil, “it was the event that most clearly and dramatically revealed a break in the economic isolation of India.”
Essay # 5. The Opening of the Suez Canal:
The second event of great significance to India was the opening of the Suez Canal. Before the construction of this canal, trade between India and Europe was hampered in several ways. Firstly, ships had to take the long sea-route round the cape of Good Hope. This kept freights at a level which prevented trade in commodities that were also produced in countries nearer to the U.K.
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Naturally trade between India and England was limited to articles in which India had a monopoly. Secondly, it gave weevils ample time to damage cargoes of wheat and oil-seeds. Thirdly, the cape-route involved the crossing of the equator twice as a result of which wheat got spoilt due to heat.
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 removed all these difficulties. The voyage to Bombay by the new route was reduced from a hundred days or more to about 25 days in ordinary cases and three weeks when faster vessels were employed. What is more, the journey became safer as monsoons and storms, which were the common features of the cape route, were avoided.
Quicker transport through Suez canal released tonnage and increased the shipping capacity competing for employment. This brought about a depression in the shipping industry. Partly on account of the shorter distance through the canal and partly on account of the increased competition among the shipping companies, the freight rates between India and Europe were slashed down.
In the 12 years following the opening of the canal, the freight on the cargo of rice and wheat from Calcutta to London fell to less than ½, from 55 shillings to 27 shillings per ton.
Reduction in freight rates together with the linking of Indian ports with the interior of the country led to a remarkable development of commerce. European industries could now supply their manufactures “at a cost within the means of the Indian consumer while Indian goods, including bulkier and heavier raw materials, could be sold in the European markets not only in good condition but also at competitive prices.”
The result can be seen in a most striking development of trade in the following decade. During 1859—60 to 1863—64, the annual average value of imports stood at Rs. 41.06 crores, and exports at Rs. 43.17 crores. During 1879—80 to 1883—84, imports had risen to Rs. 61.81 crores and exports to Rs. 80.41 crores.
The exports in wheat were especially stimulated. Thus, for example, in 1867—68, only 3 lakh cwts were exported while a decade later in 1879—80, it had risen to 2.2 million cwts—an increase of more than 7 times. The reason was that the Suez canal not only saved time for the exports of wheat and oilseeds but also enabled them to be delivered in good condition.
Before the opening of the canal, the British had enjoyed the monopoly of Indian trade. But now, other European ships also began to enter Indian waters. Trade between India and the Mediterranean ports was especially encouraged. The merchants of Marseilles, Genoa or Venice were no longer required to use the long and circuitous route through England but could send their goods direct on reasonable terms of freight.
In the field of industry, the shortening of the distance and the cheapening of the freights facilitated cheaper import of machinery and equipment. But, it also made it easier for British goods to penetrate deep into the Indian market which ultimately brought about the decline of the cottage industries.
However, the opening of the canal caused a depression in the coal industry, the set-back being due to easy foreign competition. Fortunately, this was a short-lived phase and the enormous home demand, mainly for the developing railways, brought about a quick recovery.
Famines and Distress:
Apart from the brief spell of prosperity brought about by the American Civil War, the period 1860—80 was one of great agricultural distress. Over a brief span of 20 years, the country suffered six major famines and two local scarcities, an average of one famine or scarcity every 2½ years.
Of all these, the Great Famine of 1876—78 was, in respect of the area and the population affected and the duration and intensity of the distress, the most grievous calamity of its kind that the country had experienced till then in the 19th century. It covered an area of 2,05,600 square miles affecting a population of 36.4 million. Apart from causing a loss of Rs. 150 lakhs to the govt., it took a toll of 3½ million lives.
The famines had certain far reaching consequences. Of these, the most disastrous to the prosperity of the country was the setback to agricultural progress. It was found that the methods of cultivation were generally the worst in those parts of the country which were most frequently visited by famines. The fear of a famine discouraged the cultivator from improving his land or cattle.
Apart from famines, there were other factors also which depressed the condition of the agriculturists. The high revenue assessments, fixed during the peak of the cotton boom, began to weigh heavily after the civil war was over and America resumed her supplies to England.
The slump in the cotton market was followed by a general trade depression all over the country. After 1875, the govt. also had embarked upon a policy which led her to spend more on military expeditions and army establishments. This increased the burden of taxation.
These, combined with the series of famines, produced a measure of distress which had not been experienced for many years. No wonder, the agriculturist all over country was heavily involved in debt. In the Bombay Presidency. 75% of the ryots were in debt of whom 50% were hopelessly involved.
The conditions in other parts of the country, as revealed by the investigations of Nicholls, Skrine and Peile, were no better. A significant manifestation of this distress was the riot of the peasants in certain Deccan districts in 1875.
In the districts of Poona and Ahmednagar, the peasants spontaneously rose in many places and robbed and wrecked the houses of the money lenders. The rioters had, as their aim, the practical object of destroying the money-lender’s bonds and accounts so that he was rendered unable to make recoveries.
Despite the frequent occurrence of famines, the govt. showed little appreciation of the need to extend irrigation in the country. Of the total acreage of 197.25 million under cultivation in 1880, the irrigated area in the country was 29.2 million acres. Of this, 10.6 million was irrigated by canals and the rest by tanks.
What is significant is that most of these facilities had been created before 1860. For example, the upper Bari Doab, the two Jamuna canals, the Ganges canal as well as the works in the deltas of the Krishna, Cauvery and Godavri were built before 1858. Therefore, the progress made in the construction of new irrigation works during the 20 years, 1860—1880, was extremely inadequate.
Summing up, there is nothing to suggest that the period saw any increase in the area under cultivation or any important change in the crops or the method of cultivation. If anything, during this period, the agriculturist all over India lost a great deal of the progress which had been made previously. And, therefore, “his condition was one bordering on extreme poverty.”
Essay # 6.
Indian Agriculture during 1880—1895:
Although the Suez canal had been opened in 1869 and railway construction in India begun even earlier, yet their full impact came to be felt only after 1880 when the value and composition of India’s foreign trade underwent important changes. The value went up from Rs. 127 crores in 1880—81 to Rs. 186 in 1895—96.
As regards composition, the importance of opium, indigo and raw-cotton declined while that of food grains, pulses, raw-jute, tea, hides and skins greatly increased. Food exports, in particular, showed a spectacular rise from 1.25 million tons in 1879—80 to 2.25 million tons in 1995-96.
These changes in the foreign trade had a powerful influence on the pattern of crops in the country. Thus, under the impact of expanding demand, wheat cultivation was rapidly extended in the canal-irrigated areas of the Punjab, Sind and North Western Provinces.
Similarly, the cultivation of jute was extended in Bengal, that of oil-seeds in Madras, and of cotton in Berar, central Provinces and the Deccan. However, the demand for indigo fell and the area under this crop was diverted to other commercial crops.
In short, the trend in crop-specialisation, based on the nature of the soil and climate, was firmly established and production became more based on market demand rather than domestic needs. One consequence of this crop-specialisation was that certain like Berar developed a permanent food shortage.
As this period was free from famines or scarcities, it led to a certain increase in the area under cultivation. Most of the new lands brought under the plough were either grazing fields or lands cleared of forests, there being no new or virgin lands available in the country. There was, however, no improvement in land productivity. Here the greatest difficulty was the poverty of the peasant.
As Dr. Voelcker pointed out, “the Indian farmer was second to none in his knowledge of soils and their capabilities, as well as the exact time to sow and to reap.” He had also wonderful knowledge about “rotation, the system of mixed crops and of fallowing.”
What, however, he lacked was resources. That is why an Iron plough had no significance for him because his, “half-fed bullocks were unfit to drag even a wooden plough.” Similarly, he had no use for water-pumps or manures which he could not afford to buy.
Although this period was free from any major agricultural calamity, yet it was not one of prosperity either. True, expanding exports and growing scarcities within the country had raised the prices of agricultural commodities, the general price index having moved from 119 in 1888 to 140 in 1896.
But this benefitted only the upper agricultural classes, the substantial proprietors who had a marketable surplus over and above their own requirements or landlords who became rich by raising rents of their lands. The lower agricultural classes, the vast surplus labour in the rural areas, failed to drive any gain from the expansion of trade and industry or the rise of agricultural prices.
As the famine Commission (1898) revealed, these classes suffered, as before, from daily insufficiency of food even in years of normal weather and output. Among the causes of poverty of the cultivator was the system of unequal distribution of income under which he lived and worked.
The universal land hunger had reduced the competitive power of the tenant and forced him to pay whatever rent was demanded by the landlord. The result was a rise in rents all over the country. In the ryotwari areas, the state filled the role of the exacting landlord.
At every revision, the revenue was raised; what is more, it was rigidly collected, irrespective of the condition of crop. In the four districts covered by the Deccan Agriculturist’s Relief Act, Mr. Joshi estimated that the annual borrowings of the cultivator amounted to 93% of the total assessments, and that a large part of these borrowings was for the payment of land revenue.
The rent of the landlord and the revenue demand of the state were not the only factors which impoverished the cultivator. Indebtedness was another such factor.
In the Punjab, Mr. Thorburn’s inquiry in 12 selected villages revealed that “out of 742 families, 566 were practically ruined or heavily involved in debt” and that “53% of the total cultivated land in these villages had already passed into the hands of the money-lenders.”
In the Etah district of the North Western Province, Mr. Crooke found that 56% of the people habitually borrowed so as to be able to purchase seed. As regards Deccan, Mr. Joshiestimated that 2/3 of the peasantry was in debt. This indebtedness not only compelled the cultivator to sell his produce at below the market rate, but also forced him, in the long run to part with his land and reduce himself to the position of a tenant.
As Atkinson describes, the cultivator was caught “between the devil and the deep sea. The devil in the shape of the zamindar bled him of every rupee possible by high rents, and he was forced to throw himself in the arms of the deep sea in the shape of the money lender in order to procure his financial necessaries, with the result that his independence was drowned and he merely existed on the sufferance of his financial jailor.”
The heavy rent together with the demands of the moneylender and the State, reduced the cultivator’s share in the produce of the land to the level of an ordinary village labourer’s wages, brought his standard of living down to the bare minimum, reduced his power to save and destroyed all incentives for hard work and improvement of methods of production.
It was towards the end of this period that the Govt. became convinced that legislation on the lines of the Deccan Agricultural Relief Act touched only “the fringe of the great question of agricultural indebtedness.” An inquiry was held in 1894 with a view to further reforms “including measures for restrictions upon land transfer.” But nothing came out of it.
The proposal for the establishment of agricultural banks was in the tentative stage while the Land Improvements Loans Act (1883) and the Agriculturists Loans Act (1884), providing for State advances for making permanent improvements in land and for the purchase of seeds and cattle, proved of little help.
The main difficulty was that the smaller cultivator, who needed help most, generally had no security to offer. The procedure also was complicated and time-consuming. Also, the govt. was very rigid in so far as the repayment of the loan was concerned. The result was that the amount every where “felt far short of the needs and opportunities for agricultural improvements.”
To sum up, the period 1880—1895, although free from famines, was not one of prosperity. The vast masses consisting of the small farmer, the tenant and the agricultural labourer, were living on a standard which was close to starvation.
In order to protect the country against future famines, the govt. extended irrigation facilities—the irrigated area in the country having increased from 10.6 million acres in 1878—79 to 15.3 million acres in 1896—97.
This apart, the only other development in the field of agricultural improvement was the noticeable change in the attitude of the govt. Previously, “an idea that it was impossible to effect any improvement in Indian agriculture had been seriously put forward and accepted by many”.
Now, the govt. began to increasingly realise that progress was possible and that it could be achieved only by a sustained and systematic effort on her part.
Essay # 7.
Indian Agriculture during 1896—1914:
The period of relative safety from famines ended in 1895. The next thirteen years were a long spell of misfortune for the country. Only the years 1898 and 1904 had normal and timely rainfall, otherwise famine or scarcity conditions prevailed in one or the other part of the country.
Apart from local failure of crops and limited scarcities, two major famines were experienced during this period. The famine of 1896—97 was more wide-spread and severe than any the country had experienced till then. Excluding Indian States, the famine affected a population of 62.4 million.
An estimated 7.5 lakh persons were reported to have died, the highest rate of mortality having been reached in the Central Provinces where 91.39 thousand persons died due to famine and the diseases associated with it. This was not all. Hardly had the people begun to recover from this famine when rains failed once again over a large part of India.
The famine of 1899 was not so widespread as it was severe. Lord Curzon described it as the severest and most terrible of all the famines which had visited the country in the 19th century. Despite large scale relief, it caused intense suffering and heavy mortality.
An estimated one million persons died in this famine. A noteworthy features of this famine was the very heavy mortality among cattle, about 2 million heads having perished in the central provinces and the adjoining States alone and equal number in Bombay.
These two famines were truly great tragedies. They weakened the health of the people and made them easy victims of such diseases as cholera and Plague. However, their worst effect was to put back the clock of agricultural progress. Almost all the progress made earlier was lost.
Three of their most immediate effects were:
(a) The total area under cultivation declined from 213.8 million acres in the quinquennium 1891—1895 to 208.8 million acres in 1886—1900. The decline was especially marked in U.P. and the Bombay Presidency. In the central Provinces, due to a rapid succession of bad harvests, the practice of double cropping practically disappeared.
(b) Commercial crops were replaced by food-crops. Even superior food crops were substituted by the inferior ones. For example, in the U.P., indigo and oil seeds were, to a large extent, replaced by food grains; in the central provinces, wheat, linseed and rice were all replaced to a great extent by the less paying millet crop.
(c) The really harmful effect of these famines was to discourage the peasants from investing in the land except where it was irrigated and, therefore, protected against the vagaries of weather.
Fortunately, after 1909, the rain-gods were more favorably inclined. There were no more such famines as were experienced in the closing years of the 19th century. Besides, irrigation had been extended, especially in the Punjab. This led to an increase in the area under cultivation. According to the committee on Rise in Prices and wages, between 1895—1910 as a whole, the total area under cultivation increased by 5%.
However this increase was not accompanied by a proportionate increase in agricultural production. Thorner on the basis of Blyn’s data, estimates that the index of average annual agricultural production rose from 100 in 1893-94—1895-96 to 104 in 1906—07—1915—16; food production index declined from 100 to 99 while that of non-food crops rose from 100 to 126 during the same period.
In other words, total output of food crops was near constant or slightly declining while that of commercial crops showed a distinct up-ward trend. The total agricultural production also rose but unimpressively so that the overall trend was that of stagnation.
What were the causes of this stagnation? Dr. Anstey. ascribes it to the conservative or backward out outlook of the peasant. That the Indian peasant was not backward is borne out by Dr. Voelckar. In point of fact, his ability to use modern advances was severely restricted by the size of his plot, the animal power and the capital investment and this the peasant was unable to afford.
According to Lidman and Demrose ‘, the fundamental obstacle to agricultural expansion was the insufficiency of water-supply. Much of the land in the country had inadequate rainfall and even where yields could have been higher, the farmers stuck to low Yielding varieties which were more resistant to failure of rains. That is why Indian yields were amongst the lowest in the world.
Dr. Voelckar, on the other hand, regards the problem of manure as no less important than that of water. In his opinion, “increasing exports of both crops and manures led to the exhaustion of soil and decline in its productivity.”
Lack of irrigation facilities and manures must have had an adverse effect on agricultural production. These, however, were not decisive in determining the level of agricultural productivity. The really decisive factor in the last quarter of 19th and early 20th century was the chronic and extreme shortage of capital with the great bulk of the cultivating peasantry.
The over-riding consideration with the Indian peasant, therefore, was the economy of capital. As Harold Mann points out, even the manures and fertilisers used were generally those which could be locally obtained, and with little or no cost except for labour.
Therefore, the explanation of near stagnation in Indian agriculture is to be found in the circumstances under which resources needed for agricultural expansion either dried up or were drained away by the foreign ruler, the money lender or the absentee landlord.
The three factors which accounted for the poverty of the Indian peasants were:
(i) Their indebtedness and consequently large yearly payments of interest to the moneylender,
(ii) The high incidence of land revenue demanded by the State and
(iii) High rents extorted by the landlords. The problem did not escape the notice of the Indian leaders. Dadabhai Naroji in the course of his speeches in England, explained that the chronic state of famine in Indian was the direct result of ‘continuous drain of wealth’ from the country.
R.C. Dutt blamed the high incidence and heavy enhancement of revenue for the poverty of the Indian agriculturists. Several India Leaders like Joshi and Ray traced the utter resourcelessness of ryot to the exactions of the landlord.
William Digby, found fault with the entire system of British rule in India for the sinking of the population into a state of chronic poverty-stickiness. It was this combination of political and economic factors which, acting as a built-in-depressor, blocked any improvement and modernisation of Indian agriculture.
In the face of mounting public criticism and agitation, old policies could no longer be continued. A change was necessary both on political and economic grounds. Thus were initiated, in the first few years of the 20th century, a series of reforms for improving the economic conditions of the agricultural classes.
Till the end of the 19th century, the irrigation policy of the govt. bore no relation to the requirements of the country. The turn of the century saw the beginning of a broader and bolder approach to the problem. An irrigation commission was appointed in 1901 which drew up a 20 years irrigation plan involving an outlay of Rs. 44 crores.
What is more important, the thinking of the govt. as regards the purpose of irrigation in India underwent a fundamental change. Henceforward, irrigation facilities began to be provided to those areas also where no works of ‘productive’ class were possible and which had to be protected at a certain loss to govt.
Irrigation works, whatever their scale, could not have protected the whole of India against famines. It was, therefore, necessary to improve the economic condition of those who suffered the most during famines. For this purpose, reforms were initiated in three directions.
The Land Revenue Resolution, published in 1901, recognised for the first time that the question of Land revenue was “one of the highest in national importance.”
Conceding in spirit if not in letter, practically all the demands of the critics, the Resolution assured that, in future, revenue would be equitable in character and moderate in incidence ; that it would be enhanced gradually and not all at once; that it would be raised only on ground of increase in irrigation or rise in prices and that it would be based on existing rather than prospective yields.
The declaration was extremely refreshing against the background of high revenue demand and its rigorous collection over the previous 50 years. It ultimately paved the way for the moderation of the revenue demand.
If it was necessary to protect the ryot in the ryotwari areas against enhancement of Land revenue, it was even more important to protect the tenant in the Zamindari areas against the exactions of the landlord.
For this purpose, the existing tenancy laws were amended and new measures were passed in the Central Provinces (1898), U.P. (1908); Bombay (1905) Bengal (1908); Madras (1908). The purpose of these laws was firstly, to extend the occupancy rights to certain classes of tenants and, secondly, to restrict the landlord’s powers to enhance rents arbitrarily.
The most formidable obstacle to the introduction of agricultural improvement in India was the poverty of the peasant. Agriculture could not be improved so long as the poor cultivator was made to pay, on every bit of capital invested in land, the exorbitant rate of interest charged by the money-lender.
This fact had long been recognised but actual steps for providing relief against indebtedness were taken only at the beginning of the present century. One was to impose restrictions on the power of the agriculturist to transfer his land and thereby take away from him the most valuable security against which he raised loans.
Towards, this end, Land Alienation Acts were passed in the Punjab in 1900; U.P. in 1903 and N. W. F. P. in 1904. In Bombay, the Land Revenue Amendment Act of 1901 contained provisions under which transfer of Land could be restricted. Another was to create, through the co-operative societies Act of 1904, an alternative agency for providing cheaper credit.
Although the Act of 1904 was replaced by another one passed in 1912, the cooperative movement was as yet far from meeting the credit needs of the agriculturist. This may be seen from the fact that in 1911—12, the total value of loans issued by the societies amounted to barely Rs. 3.35 crores as against an estimated Rs. 375—500 crores provided by the money lenders..
These measures, halting as they were, provided no solution to the basis problem of Indian agriculture, viz. that of lack of capital both for current needs and improvements. In fact, the problem of relieving the peasant from the crushing burden of debt and providing cheaper credit had hardly begun to be tackled. What was needed was a drastic remedial action.
This, however, meant changing the very basis on which the land system in the country was built. The foreign Govt. could hardly be expected to take action along these lines. It could not have destroyed the absentee-landlord and the moneylender who were her own creation. In the circumstances, all it did was to tinker with the problem rather than take bold steps to remove the root—causes of poverty in the country.
As regards the economic condition of the agricultural classes, the rise in prices, which became especially marked after 1905, benefitted the rich landowner and the substantial cultivator who had a surplus to sell.
The prices of agricultural raw-materials having risen more than those of manufactures, the terms of trade moved in favour of the agriculturist who could now purchase more of manufactured goods with a given quantity of his produce.
The improvement in the condition of the substantial cultivator can be seen in the fact that he, instead of borrowing miney, bagan to lend. Ordinarily, the condition of the labouring class should have deteriorated due to the rise in prices.
But, as things turned out, there was an appreciable rise in wages as well both in the town and the countryside. In addition, greater employment opportunities were available in new centres of trade and industry.
Therefore, the labouring class also gained. It was only the small cultivator who continued to live near the margin of subsistence. He alone failed to benefit from the rise in prices because he had no surplus of produce to sell. On the other hand, the triple burden of rent, interest and revenue remained at the high level. It was he, therefore, who needed greater attention in the years to come.
Essay # 8.
Indian Agriculture during the First World War and After:
The years immediately after 1914 were fairly favourable so far as rainfall is concerned. Throughout the war years, rainfall was satisfactory. Then came the year 1918—19 when crops failed and the country was gripped by a famine comparable to that of 1877—78 or 1899—1900.
The worst affected areas were the Bombay Presidency, the United Provinces, the Punjab, parts of the Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, Mysore and Hyderabad.
The Govt., abandoning, its policy of non-interference in the food grain trade, introduced a system of rigid control over available supplies and their distribution. Restrictions were imposed on exports while domestic supplies were supplemented by imports from Australia.
Besides, revenue remissions and suspensions were liberally granted. The country therefore was able to face the calamity successfully as can be seen from the fact that the number of people provided relief was much less than that in 1899—1900.
The situation had hardly turned for the better when the rains again failed in the summer of 1920. Scarcity was declared in some districts of the Bombay Presidency and Central Provinces. Distress was especially severe in the Deccan districts of Madras and Hyderabad State.
Wheat prices rose very high so that it was found necessary to reimpose restrictions on wheat exports as well as to arrange imports. Leaving aside these two years, weather-gods were, on the whole, favourable. There was neither any famine nor any major scarcity in the country although rains did occasionally fail in one or the other part.
In common with the rest of the world, there was, in India also, a general upward movement of prices, the wholesale index (1873 = 100) rising from 147 in 1914 to 281 in 1920. However, this rise was not uniformly shared by all commodities.
Prices of imported articles rose much above those of articles exported. This may be seen from the fact that price index (Base = 1880) of exports moved from 160 to 199 between 1914—18 while that of imports increased from 114 to 289 during the same period. The crops were generally good during 1914—17.
This, combined with Govt. controls, kept their prices low while the prices of imported articles such as cloth, sugar, salt and kerosene oil rose abnormally. There is, thus, no truth in the contention that the economic position of the farmer improved during the war period.
If anything, it actually worsened. The widespread distress resulted in market lootings in many parts of the country in 1917 and the riots had to be suppressed by force. The situation eased after 1920 when there was a 40% decline in the prices of manufactured articles while export prices fell by only 25%.
Far more important was the continuous decline in the average productivity per acre of food crops during this period. Average per acre productivity of rice declined from Rs. 40.48 in 1910—11—1914—15 to Rs. 36.91 in the quinquennium 1925— 26—1929—30; that of wheat fell from Rs. 23.98 to Rs. 21.56 and that of Jowar from Rs. 17.05 to Rs. 13.89 during the same period.
The reason for the declining food production is to be found in the greater availability of irrigation facilities in regions specialising in commercial crops. Also, agricultural research had exclusively been concentrated on evolving improved varieties of commercial crops and not much attention was paid to improving the strains of food grains.
With food production thus declining, the balance between increasing population and food supply was maintained partly by imports but largely by the easy but cruel expendient of pushing down the already low per capita food consumption. This can be seen from the fact that the per capita availability of food grains fell from 547 lbs. in the decade 1906—7—1915—16 to 461 lbs. in the decade 1926— 27—1935—36.
A fundamental change occurred in 1919 when, under the reformed constitution, agriculture, cooperation and irrigation became provincial subjects. Agricultural research and provision of finance for irrigation, however remained with the centre which also retained the power of general superintendence, co-ordinates and direction in respect of the transferred subjects.
Since finance remained under the control of the central govt., the provinces could not initiate any bold scheme of agricultural improvement. Within this limitation, the provincial govts. directed their attention towards providing better irrigation facilities, encouraging the growth of cooperative societies, undertaking tenancy reforms and improving agricultural productivity.
The period also saw a considerable expansion of irrigation facilities. Many of the projects, launched on the recommendation of the irrigation Commission, were completed while new ones were taken in hand. Among the works completed during this period were the Triple Canal Project in the Punjab and the system of Godavari Canals in Bombay.
As a result, the average irrigated area under govt. works of nearly 18 million acres when the Irrigation Commission reported, rose to 30 million acres in 1933. This was far more than the irrigated area in any country of the world. Even U.S.A. had only 2/3 as much as India.
This achievement, impressive thought, did not amount to much for, with all the increase in irrigation, India had only 12.5% of her total cultivated area under state irrigation works.
Another notable event was the appointment of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in 1926 to examine and report specifically on the condition of agricultural and rural economy in India. Significantly, the whole problem of land revenue and land tenure was excluded from the scope of the Commission.
It is indicative of the attitude of the govt. which, under pressure of events, was willing to help boost agricultural production by providing facilities in respect of irrigation, credit and research but was not prepared to permit an examination, leave aside a change, in the basic land system of the country.
The commission, therefore, confined itself to marking recommendations, regarding sub-division and fragmentation of holdings, improvement of livestock, irrigation, marketing, co-operation, rural education with the aim of brining about “greater efficiency through out the whole field of agricultural production” so as to render “the business of farming more profitable to the cultivator.”
One of the most important recommendations of the commission related to the establishment of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research which would “promote, guide, and co-ordinate agricultural research through-out India and link it up with agricultural research in other parts of the British Empire and in foreign countries.” The council was created in 1929.
Essay # 9.
Indian Agriculture and the Depression:
The great Depression, which began in 1929, was one of the worst ever-recorded. No country, whether agricultural or industrial, escaped its devastating effects. The chief feature of the depression was a heavy, continuous, and universal fall of prices between September, 1929 to December, 1934 ranging from 30% in the U.K., to 41% in France and 38% in India.
The fall of prices was, however, not uniformly shared by all commodities. It was much greater in the case of food stuffs and raw-materials than in the ease of manufactured articles.
In India, for example, the price index (March, 1933) of raw jute stood at 38 but for jute manufactures at 68; raw cotton had, in the same month, fallen to 79 but cotton manufactures showed a rise of 12% above the pre-war level; cereals had fallen to 61 but metals still stood at 94. This relatively heavier fall of agricultural prices led to some very serious consequences for India.
In the first place, agriculture became un-remunerative over a greater part of the country. According to Prof. Brij Narain, the average net income per acre per year in the canal colonies of the Punjab declined from Rs. 32.50 in 1928—29 to Rs. 7.82 in 1930—31. If this was the condition in the canal colonies of the better off Punjab, the condition in the rain-fed areas of the country can be better imagined than described.
The condition in Bengal was especially bad owing to its dependence on jute cultivation and export at a time when three was a depression in the jute industry. In 1930—31, the aggregate value of the Bengal’s jute crop was not more than 1/5 of what it was in 1926. The result was financial paralysis which was met by voluntary crop restriction.
Worse still was the condition of the tenant. This may be seen from the average net income per man per day of 39 tenants, working on a govt. farm in Punjab, which fell from about 56 paise in 1928—29 to less than 6 paise in 1930—31.
While the income of the farmer declined, land revenue and water rates remained practically the same except in U.P and Bihar where remissions or suspensions were granted on a liberal scale. The payment of these dues, therefore, absorbed an increasing proportion of the farmer’s depressed income.
Many found the burden unbearable and were forced to sell their gold and ornaments. Even the percentage of arrears to current demand of revenue in the Punjab increased from 4.9% in 1926—27 to 35% in 1931—32 while the percentage of current collection to current revenue demand declined from 72 to 38 in central Provinces and from 85 to 27 in Bengal.
The farmer lost in another way also. The fall in the agricultural prices was far greater than that of industrial ones. In other words, what the farmer bought was dearer and what he sold was cheaper than before. Therefore, he had to sell more of his crop in order to be able to purchase the same quantity of manufactured goods. And this meant additional hardship to the agricultural population.
According to the Central Banking Enquiry committee, agricultural debt amounted to Rs. 881 crores in 1929 at which time the value of the principal crops was about Rs. 1018 crores. By 1933, the value of these crops had almost halved to about Rs. 534 crores. In other words, the burden of the debt almost doubled.
With incomes fallen and debt burden increased, the farmers found themselves unable 10 clear their dues to the co-operative society or the money lender so that 47% of the loans all over British India in 1932—33 became over due. There was widespread agrarian discontent in the country. The debtor—creditor and landlord—tenant relations were embittered to almost breaking point and the situation became explosive.
The depression in agriculture affected all countries, and almost everywhere, the govt. intervened both directly and indirectly, to assist, it. Australia gave a fixed bounty on all wheat grown, irrespective of the selling price. In Egypt, steps were taken to safeguard sale and expropriation of land. Rumania reduced all debts to co-operative societies by 25%.
In contrast, the Govt. of India took the view that the depression was caused by world factors and that nothing could be done to counteract its effects. While other countries followed expansionist policies under state control and direction the authorities in India, following orthodox principles of currency and public finance, concentrated their energies on balancing the budgets and maintaining the exchange rate.
The price policy of the Govt. bore no relation to the needs of the agriculturist except in U.P. where the sugar cane grower was guaranteed a minimum price. As for restrictions on output, the International Restriction Scheme applied to India only in respect of tea and rubber while in jute, an effort was made to persuade the cultivator to restrict cultivation.
For meeting the problem created by mounthing debts, most countries had, as a preliminary measure, declared a moratorium on debt payments. In no province in India was any step taken in this regard. As regards the adjustment or scaling down of debts, the U.P. and C.P. were the only provinces to take action.
The U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act (1934) brought about automatic scaling in some cases while the central provinces adopted the method of voluntary conciliation under the Debt conciliation Act of 1933. Barring these isolated steps, “the govt. took little action to counteract the effects of the depression.”
The depression proper lifted by about 1936—37. It was just then that popular Congress Ministries began to function under the reformed constitution. As was to be expected, these ministries immediately addressed themselves to the acute agricultural problem. Legislation concerning Moratoria and scaling down of debts was passed. These measures might have been useful five years earlier.
Time had mostly passed when they were actually thought of or passed. Besides, these govts. were mostly short-lived and, therefore, could not administratively follow up the acts passed. Even in respect of long-term positive measures for helping the agriculturist, the newly-elected provincial govts. had hardly gone beyond the stage of Planning when the Second world war brought their life to an end.
Till 1921, there was a slight increase in the area per head under cultivation. It was not because the cultivation was so much extended but because the increase in population was insignificant. After 1921, population began to increase rapidly but the increase in cultivation failed to keep pace with the growth in numbers.
As a result, the land per capita under cultivation declined from 111 cents in 1921 to 104 cents in 1931. Besides, there was an increasing trend towards the substitution of commercial crops for food grains and cultivation of better-quality irrigated lands under commercial crops leaving inferior soils to the raising of food grains.
The overall effect was to reduce the area under food grains from 158.9 million acres in 1921—22 to 156.9 million acres in 1931—32 and food production from 54.3 million tons to 50.1 million tons just when population increased by a net 23.2 millions. The food situation in the country became serious.
Domestic supply, supplemented by imports, was precariously balanced against demand at a low level of consumption. The slightest disturbance caused either by rise in incomes or fall in supply could put food out of the reach of many and cause famine. This is indeed what happened in Bengal during the war.
Essay # 10.
Indian Agriculture during the Second World War:
In the first few months following the out-break of the war in 1939, it appeared that the clouds of depression that had gathered thick on Indian agricultural, would be dispersed at last. Prices of raw-materials and food-stuffs rose and an increased demand for export of commodities like raw-jute and oil-seeds appeared. This prosperity was, however, short lived.
The difficulties of shipping and, more so, the capture of one country after another by Germany and the spread of war by Japan in the East, reduced the area to which exports from India were either possible or permitted. The magnitude of the problem can be estimated from the fact that with Europe alone, India’s loss of trade amounted to over rupees 30 crores or 1/6 of her total over-seas trade.
The commodities most affected were ground nuts, raw-jute, and cotton. The first problem in India arising out of war was, thus, of the so-called agricultural surpluses. The govt. met the situation by restricting the area under cultivation of jute and cotton and finding other profitable uses for groundnuts.
Worse than the problem of agricultural surpluses was the problem of the food grain shortage. While the demand for food had greatly increased on account of the arrival of war evacuees and prisoners, a large foreign army, and increased consumption within the country, the supply position deteriorated.
In view of the high prices, it was now possible for the farmer to pay off his fixed charges by selling a smaller quantity than before. The rest he retained for his self-consumption. Unfortunately just when the marketable surplus at home decreased, imports from abroad also declined from 2.15 million tons in 1939 to 0.5 millions tons in 1941.
Besides, the fear of currency depreciation and the expectation of a further rise in prices led to stock building, by consumers traders and farmers much beyond their normal requirements and were important factors in raising the prices.
The situation took an ugly turn with the fall of Burma in April, 1942 and the resulting loss of rice-supplies from that country. The situation could have been still saved had the govt. taken prompt and energetic measures to dehoard the stocks and ensure their equitable distribution. The govt., however, was complascent and her measures half-hearted.
There was lack of co-operation between different administrative units so that speculators exploited the situation to their full advantage. The result was the Bengal Famine in 1943 which, in the words of B.M. Bhatia, was a tragedy in unpreparedness’.
15 lakhs human lives were lost before the govt. introduced rationing in selected centres. At the same time, steps were taken to import food grains from abroad while, within the country, ‘the Grow-More-Food’ Compaign was launched.
A rise in the prices of agricultural commodities benefitted only the well-to-do landlords who had large marketable surpluses. It was they who repaid a large part of their debts. However, indebtedness among the small farmers did not decline while terms of tenancy grew harsher and the conditions of agricultural labourers grew worse.
In-fact, sky-high prices and near famine conditions forced the small farmers to sell their lands. In Bengal alone, in one year, April 1943 to April 1944, 25% of all peasant families sold or mortgaged their land, about 2/3 of it falling into the hands of local residents, chiefly absentee landlords.
Essay # 11.
Indian Agriculture during the Partition:
The partition of the country in 1947 led to very serious consequences so far as Indian agriculture was concerned. It left India with 82% of the population and 84% of the total sown area of the undivided country while the remaining 18% of population and 16% of the sown area went over to Pakistan.
Although Pakistan got slightly less than what her share of population demanded, but her area was otherwise very valuable in that it comprised 26% of the area under rice and 25% under wheat in pre-Partition India.
Pakistan more than made up her slightly less share of the sown area through better irrigation facilities also. Out of 70 million acres of irrigated land in undivided India, 48 million or 67% remained with India, while 22 million acres or 33% of the total went to Pakistan’s share. As a result, 45.2% of the net sown area in Pakistan came to be served by irrigation works, the corresponding average in the Indian Union being only 18.9%.
Not only a larger share of the irrigated area went to Pakistan, excepting perhaps in U.P. irrigation works in India were largely of the ‘protective character’ i.e. they were meant to ward-off famine conditions than to produce a significant increase in yield per acre.
This was particularly true of irrigation in South India, especially in Bombay, Deccan, Mysore and Madras. Thus, Partition reduced India to greater dependence on the vagaries of rainfall and that accounts for the fluctuations from year to year in her agricultural production.
Even before the Partition, India was deficient in food grains. This deficiency was now aggravated. With 82% of the population of undivided India, she produced only 68% and 65% of the total preparation yield of rice and wheat crops respectively.
On the other hand, the areas that went to form Pakistan were normally surplus in wheat production to the extent of 0.5 million tons. This surplus would have been consumed in India had the Partition not taken place. Now, of course, it was not available. Thus, the partition of the country enlarged the food deficit in India by half a million tons.
This food shortage necessitated a larger area under cultivation being given to the production of food crops. But the partition had created two other problems as well. It left India with only 60% of raw cotton and 19% of raw-jute production to cater to two of her major industries, Pakistan having got 40% of cotton and 81% of raw-jute to her share. India, thus, became a heavy importer of these two commodities also.
Circumstances created by mutual antipathies necessitated programmes of self-sufficiency in these raw-materials as well. This led to a competitive demand on cultivable area available. The partition, in short, aggravated the problem of disequilibrium between the supply of available cultivable land and the demand for essential requirements of food and commercial crops.
This also implied that agricultural planning in India should have priority over industrial planning in order to relieve the country of its dependence on outside sources. In other words, the partition necessitated a more than proportionate emphasis on agricultural development. To quote Dr. Bal Krishna, “in proportion to this emphasis, the schemes of industrial development in India suffered considerably”, especially in the First Plan.
Essay # 12.
Agriculture under the Plans:
On the eve of Independence, Indian agriculture was caught in a serious crisis. A clear manifestation of this crisis was the virtual stagnation of food production for more than four decades since the beginning of the 20th Century. What was even more disturbing, food production was showing a declining trend.
During the first 24 years of the 20th century, it increased by 0.3% per year; in the next 24 years, it declined at the rate of 0.02% per year despite the fact that droughts turned out to be relatively moderate and less frequent. Consequently, whereas India was self-sufficient in food in 1880, on the eve of Independence, she faced an estimated deficit of 10 million tons.
An already bad situation was made worse by the Partition. A country which was for over a century an exporter of agricultural products now found it impossible to avoid heavy imports of food grains, cotton, jute, vegetable oils and tobacco.
This crisis of Indian agriculture found its most dramatic expression in severe shortages of various agricultural products on the one hand and sporadic but widespread peasant unrest on the other. It was against this background that programmes for agricultural development came to be formulated under the Five Year Plans.
Action was directed along two lines. The first was to initiate a series of land reform measures. In the Zamindari areas, the laws provided for the abolition of all intermediaries. In the ryotwari areas, attempt was made to protect tenants against eviction by granting to certain categories permanent rights in the agricultural land which they had been occupying.
The second was to reduce rents by fixing upper limits at say 1/4 to 1/6 of the produce as against the widely prevailing fifty-fifty division of the crop. Ceilings were also imposed on existing agricultural holdings as well as on the future acquisition of land. An attempt was made to encourage agricultural co-operatives.
The second was to develop an infra-structure for agriculture. Up to the end of the Third Plan, as much as Rs. 1908 crores were spent by the govt. on agriculture including irrigation, flood control, community development, etc.
In addition, there was a sizeable non-plan expenditure also. No doubt, there was leakage, wastage, and inefficiency. It is also true that the benefits of these outlays went mostly to the richer and some medium farmers.
Nevertheless, these outlays did play a positive role in the development of Indian agriculture. For example, the net irrigated area increased by 25% from 20.9 million hectares in 1950—61 to 26.3 million hectares in 1965—66.
Throughout this period, there was an extension of the area under cultivation which rose by 14% from 119 million hectares in 1950—51 to 136 million hectares in 1965—66. Of course, most of the new land brought under cultivation was of poor quality and this tended to slow down the increase in the average yields in the country as a whole.
All the same, extension of cultivation did help increase the output on the one hand and provide livelihood for a larger number of farmers on the other.
Mention may also be made of the sharp reduction in the relative burden of taxation on agriculture. This is evident from the fact that agricultural taxes constituted 7% of the central and state revenues in 1951—52; in 1956—66, their share in the govt’s revenues had come down to 4.2%. This certainly helped to leave more resources for agricultural development with bigger landlords.
In the schemes of agricultural development persued through successive Five Year Plans, two promotional agencies were relied upon for playing key and vital roles.
These were;
(i) Community Development Projects and
(ii) Cooperation.
Community Projects, which began in 1952 with an equivalent of 300 development blocks, covered the whole country by the end of the Third Plan.” As regards cooperation, the aim was to ensure that the facilities such as credit, inputs and services which the farmer required, were institutionalised to the greatest possible extent.
What was the sum total of these efforts? In the earlier fifties, over the period of the First Five Year Plan, the out put of all agricultural commodities went up by 22.2% giving an annual rate of increase of 4.2%.
In the succeeding period of the Second Plan, there was another increase of 21.7% in out put, giving an annual rate of 4.3%. In the Third Plan period ending in 1965—66, however, this trend was sharply reversed with the output of agricultural commodities declining by 7.4%.
The growth rates in food production during the First three plans were 5.5%, 3.8% and 2.3% respectively. Over the years from 1951—52, to 1965—66, the increase in aggregate production was of the order of 37.8% and an increase in the production of food grains alone of the order of 34.1%. Taking the whole period together, the growth rate works out at about 2.5% and in food grains alone at 2.3%.
A characteristic feature of agricultural growth was its uneven spread. Generally speaking, the output of commercial crops grew faster than that of food grains which shows that capitalist agriculture was developing. Even within each group, variations were quite marked.
For example, in the non-food grains group, the compound growth rate for rubber (7.29), Coffee (6.15), Mesta (7.48) and Cotton (4.55) were substantially higher than those for oil-seeds (3.35), jute 2.09, tea (1.55) and sugar-cane (3.45). Within the food grains group, variations were not so large, except for Jowar (2.67) and pulses (1.68) for which the rates of growth were low.
While variations in growth performance of different crops were significant, the variations in the growth rates achieved in different regions were more striking. A number of states, in particular Punjab, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, recorded increases in production appreciably higher than the national average.
Punjab was on the top rung of the ladder followed and Madras, production increased by as much as 7% a year. For other states, the rate of growth was below the national average, the lowest being in the case of Assam.
This growth rate of 2.5% per annum, which S.R. Sen regards as ‘unprecedented’ was impressive in absolute terms and in comparison with the pre—1951 ‘stagnation’. However, when seen in terms of per Capita growth and in comparison with needs, the achievement was disappointing. It was not enough to keep pace with the annual 2.5% rise in population.
This may be seen from the fact that the per capita availability of cereals from domestic production was 10.7 ounces in 1951 and only 10.5 ounces in 1966.
This failure of food production to keep pace with increasing population was reflected, in the early sixties, in rising food prices, an aggravation of inflationary pressures, mounting dependence on imports and foreign aid for feeding the people and the resulting conditions of popular distress and social unrest.
The danger signal could not be ignored and the govt. realised the need for giving a higher priority to the requirements of increased agricultural production. This realisation gave birth to the new agricultural strategy. But why did we fail? There were several reasons for it.
One was that the land reforms were frustrated to a considerable extent by loopholes in land laws and connivance of the administrative machinery. Consequently, property ties and social relationship did not change radically enough and impeded agricultural development.
The rural credit system was still dominated by professional money lenders who charged excessively high rates of interest. Cooperative development was yet insufficient to break this monopoly. High rates made many potential agricultural investments unprofitable.
The principal reason, however, was our wrong approach to the problem of agricultural development. Working on the philosophy of ‘Demonstration Effect’, all resources and efforts were concentrated on the better off villages, and even in these villages, on the rich farmers. Little or no attention was paid to millions of small, poor, and marginal farmers.
As Schulze has pointed out, they themselves were unable to cope with the risk and uncertainty involved in adopting new techniques and practices. As a consequence, they remained indifferent to all developmental schemes and efforts. It is this non-participation of the vast majority of the agricultural labour force which lies at the root of our failure in agriculture.