In this essay we will discuss about the food problems in India. After reading this essay you will learn about:- 1. Introduction to the Food Problems in India 2. Economic Planning and Food Problems 3. Food Policy 4. Food Production and Imports 5. State Trading of Food Grains 6. Controlling Food Deficit.

List of Essays on Food Problems in India


Essay Contents:

  1. Essay on the Introduction to Food Problems in India
  2. Essay on Economic Planning and Food Problems
  3. Essay on the Food Policy
  4. Essay on Food Production and Imports
  5. Essay on the State Trading of Food Grains
  6. Essay on Controlling Food Deficit


Essay # 1. Introduction to the Food Problems in India:

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Food Problem has been one of India’s major problems both before and after Independence. It had its beginnings in the last quarter of the 19th Century although several new factors aggravated it in the post-Independence period. In order to correctly understand the present situation, it is necessary to grasp its historical past.

According to the Famine Commission of 1880, British India including Burma had an annual surplus of 5.16 million tons which, taken as a whole, was sufficient for ‘meeting the demands of any part of the country likely to suffer from famine at any one time.’

Working on the basis of average annual food exports from the country, the census commission of 1951 arrived at the firm conclusion that “in or about 1880 India was normally surplus in food grains including both rice and wheat and the surplus was of the order of 12 lakh tons.”

Normally, a country exporting this much quantity would be deemed as surplus in food grains. However, in the colonial economy of India, these exports formed a part of the annual tribute extorted from the country. A great part of the revenues of India, as R.C. Dutt has explained, was derived in the shape of land revenue collected from peasant-cultivators or landlords who, in turn, extracted rents from their tenants.

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Cultivators paid their revenue or rents by selling a part of their produce, keeping only an insufficient stock for their own consumption. Exporters or their agents bought what the cultivators were compelled to sell and shipped it abroad.

Exports of food grains can not, therefore, be regarded as a proof of the existence of surplus, much less a measure of its quantity. This is evident from the fact that even in the famine years, 1896-97 and 1899-1900, India exported 1.5 million and 2.2 million tons of food grains respectively.

Can it be said that even in the famine year 1896-97 when 4.5 million people died of starvation, India had a surplus of 1.5 million tons which was exported?

Yet another proof of the non-existence of the ‘alleged surplus’ lies in the sharp and continuous rise in prices, particularly of food, after 1885. The average index of food prices rose from 116.6 in 1887 to 144.1 in 1896 (1871 = 100). Therefore, all talk about India being a surplus country in food in 1880 is unreal.

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All that can be said is that in the year 1880, demand and supply of food grains were ‘precariously balanced’ and that an increase in population or a decline in production was likely to upset the balance and cause a famine.

Up to 1921, there was some improvement in agricultural production and the situation was saved. The area under cultivation went up from 103 cents per head in 1901 to 111 in 1921.

As a result of the action taken on the recommendation of the Irrigation Commission, irrigation was extended, especially in the rich wheat- producing areas of the Punjab and western U.P. where the percentage of irrigated land went up from 19 in 1891 to 25 in 1921.

The double cropped area in the country likewise increased from 18% to 19%. The combined effect of all these factors was a remarkable increase in wheat production which rose from 5 million tons to 8.34 million tons. As against this increase in food, population rose by a bare 5% from 236 million to 248 million in a period of 30 years.

It is in the period after 1921 that the food situation took a turn for the worse. This was brought about by two factors. The First was that population began to increase rapidly but the increase in the cultivated area failed to keep pace. As a result, the per capita cultivated area sharply declined from 111 cents in 1921 to 84 cents in 1951.

The second was the substitution of commercial crops for food crops. What is more significant, the better quality irrigated land began lo be diverted to commercial crops leaving only inferior lands to the raising of food grains.

Consequently, during the two decades 1921-22 to 1941 -42, the area under food grains cultivation declined from 158.6 million acres to 156.5 million acres and food output declined from 54.3 million tons to 45.7 million tons just when population increased by 62.2 million persons.

This should have made the food situation look serious. But the unprecedented fall in food grain prices, brought about by the world depression, confused the picture and led many to take an optimistic view of the situation.

Prof. P.J. Thomas, for example, claimed that “the increase in population between 1920-21—1921-22 to 1930-31—1931-32 had been 10.4% but agricultural production increased by 16% and industrial production by 51%. R. Palme Dutt, likewise, concluded in 1940 that the rate of growth of food production has up to the present outstripped the rate of growth of population.”

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In this connection, a very significant point is made by R.C. Desai who observes that between 1931-41, the total consumer expenditure on food remained constant despite the increase in population.

It means that, with the decline in incomes during the depression, per capita consumption of food fell proportionately to increase in population. India was thus able to meet the rise in demand only through the cruel method of reducing her already low level of consumption.

Even the producer reduced his domestic consumption and sold more of his produce in order to gel cash to pay land revenue and debt charges. This gave the impression of an increasing food production.

That there was no actual increase is confirmed by a recent study of S. R. Sen which shows that between 1924—44, food grains production declined at an average annual rate of .02%. Thus the food situation in the country, far from being a surplus, was explosive on the eve of the world war II.

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An equilibrium between domestic supply, sup­plemented by annual imports of 2 million tons, and demand at a very low level of consumption had, no doubt, been reached. But this balance was so delicate that the slightest disturbance, caused either by fall in supply or rise in incomes, could put food out of the reach of many and cause famine. This is what happened in Bengal in 1943.

The partition of the country further worsened the situation. India got 82% of the total population of the continent but only 75% of the cereal production. The disadvantage was greater in rice and wheat where India got 68% and 65% respectively of the total output.

Even more significant was the fact that Pakistan got territories where 45% of the total cropped area was irrigated as compared to just 19% on India. This was responsible for rendering the food production of the country highly unstable and making her more vulnerable to famines and scarcities.

According to the estimate of the Food Grain Enquiry Committee, 1952, the Partition caused a net loss of 7-8 lakh tons in the annual supply of the Indian Union.

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Thus, the emergence of food shortage and its growth was implicit in the Indian situation on the eve of Independence. The production in 1947-48 was less than that in 1900-01. The population, on the other hand, was growing at a more rapid pace that it had done before.

In addition, there was also a large backlog of hunger. As early as 1888, the enquiry conducted under orders of Lord Dufferin revealed that “…a considerable proportion of population suffered from a daily insufficiency of food for a considerable part of the year in the greater part of India.”

Sir John Megaw estimated in 1933 that some 14% of India’s population did not get enough food to eat even in a normal year. The Food Grains Enquiry Committee put this proportion at 33% of the total population.

With the increase in employment and improvement of incomes, this backlog of hunger or ‘dormant demand’ was bound to be activated and lead to rapid increase in demand. Without a breakthrough in agricultural production, food was thus certain to become the most pressing economic problem of free India. And, precisely, this is what happened.


Essay # 2. Economic Planning and Food Problems:

First Plan:

By the time the first plan came to be launched, the deficit, as measured by imports, was around 3 million tons. The plan fixed an output target of 61.5 million tons of food grains.

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It was thought that an increase in this order would be sufficient to provide ‘food for all’ at the then existing level of consumption, and eliminate imports From the point of view of food production, the period of the First Plan turned out to be the best in the post-Independence era.

As against the target of 61.5 million tons, actual production in the last year of the plan stood at 65.8 million tons. This improvement was reflected in the decline in imports as well as the fall in food prices. Imports came down from 4.8 million tons in 1951 to 0.7 million tons while the index number of wholesale food prices declined from 398.6 to 313.2.

Second Plan:

It is against this background that the second plan was drawn up. The main emphasis in this plan was on development of basic and heavy industries. Agricul­ture was no more considered important as the gap between need and availability was thought to be very small.

It was, therefore, estimated that “an increase in the production of food grains from 66 million tons to 76 million tons or so should ensure maintenance of self-sufficiency, on an average, at slightly higher standards of consumption.” The target was unrealistic in so far as it ignored the effect of an increase in population and incomes.

Understandably, trouble started from the very beginning. Despite production having increased lo 79.7 million tons, supplies began to run short of market demand. This led to a rise in food grain prices whose index went up from 86.6 in 1955—56 to 115.2 in 1958—59. Imports also shot-up from 1.4 million tons in 1956 to 5.1 million tons in 1960.

This paradox of rising production, increasing imports and yet rising prices can only be explained by the increase in demand caused by rising incomes. Economic development had activated demand which began to increase no only because of the increase in population but also due to the rise in incomes. This was not realised and the blame for rising prices was put on climatic factors and anti-social practices of traders.

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The reality was that the country was faced with a serious food shortage. The agricultural Production Team of the Ford Foundation estimated the likely shortage at 28 million tons in 1966 and, therefore, recommended “an immediate and drastic increase in food production.”

Third Plan:

The crisis depended as the third plan began. Demand was rising on account of increase in population and rise in incomes brought about by increased defence and developmental outlay. This could have been met only by a spectacular increase in food production.

Unfortunately, the rain-gods turned hostile and, instead of an increase, production declined from 82.7 million tons in 1961—62 to 72.3 million tons in 1965—66. Imports had to be stepped up.

Earlier in May 1960, India signed an agreement with the U.S.A. for the supply of 16 million tons of wheat and one million tons of rice to cover the gap till 1964. Even this failed to ease the situation. Food prices rose sharply, the index rising from 123.5 in 1962—63 to 175.5 in 1965— 66.

Taking an overall view of the plan-period as a whole, we find that food difficulties arose primarily from rapid increase in population and incomes. As compared with 361 million in 1950-51, India had to feed a population of 511 million in 1966— 67. This gives a growth rate of 2.5% per year.

The per capita income between 1950—51 to 1964—65 increased by 28% on an average rate of 1.8% per year. Assuming an income elasticity of demand of 0.8 for food, we get, for this reason only, an annual increase in demand of about 1.4%. Add to this 2.5% annual increase due to rise in population and we get an annual increase of 4% in demand for food.

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Against this, the annual increase in food production during the First Plan was 4.4%; during the second 4.5% but in the third, even if the last year of severe drought is ignored, it came to a bare 2.1%. In short, in the first two plans increase in production was keeping pace with the growth of demand but, during the third, it fell far behind.


Essay # 3. Food Policy:

In spite of the frequent famines in the 19th century, India did not develop a food policy till 1943. There was neither any attempt at increasing food production nor any effort to control prices and distribution of food grains.

It was the Bengal Famine which marked the end of the era of “Masterly inactivity” and the beginning of a food policy in India. The policy, as it was evolved, aimed at increasing production and controlling its distribution.

As regards production, a Grow More Food Compaign was launched in 1942 which, without fixing any production targets, tried to bring about an increase in food production through:

(a) Shift from cash to food crops;

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(b) Intensive cultivation and

(c) Extension of cultivation.

Although “the measures which were taken were doubtless in the right direction, but the objectives were too diversified, the effort was inadequate, and, in most cases, the necessary vigour and drive was lacking.” Following the recommendation of the Food Grains Policy Committee (1947), the compaign was continued for another five years but on a more systematic basis.

The objective of the new policy was to achieve self-sufficiency by 1952 and, among the means, greater reliance was placed on minor irrigation works, distribution of improved seeds, expansion of fertiliser production and reclamation of waste lands.

Targets were fixed and allocated to different provinces. A food Commissioner was appointed at the Centre and a central Tractor Organisation set up the reclamation of waste lends.

Shortly after the programme of self-sufficiency was launched, the country came to experience acute shortage in cotton and jute also on account of difficulties over imports from Pakistan. Accordingly, an integrated programme of simul­taneous increase in production of food grains, cotton and jute was launched in June 1950.

The Enquiry Committee, set up in 1952, to examine the working of the Grow More Food Compaign came to the conclusion that it had not achieved the results expected of it.

Against the target of 4.4 million tons, actual increase in food production was only 3.4 million tons. The Committee, therefore, recom­mended that “the present GMF campaign should be enlarged so as to cover a wider plan for development of village life in all its aspects.”

The integrated scheme of food production along with the recommendations of the GMF enquiry committee was incorporated in the First Five Year Plan and a target of 7.7 million tons of additional food grains was fixed. The target was over-reached. Production stood at the record figure of 68.7 million tons in 1953-54 which meant an increase of 30% over the first year of the plan.

While production had increased, it did not mean that “the food problem had been solved once for all.” However, in their enthusiasm for rapid industrialisation in the second plan, the planners failed to give food the attention it deserved. Agriculture and com­munity development received only 11.8% of the total outlay in the second plan as against 15.1% in the First.

What is more, 81.7% of the outlay under the broad head of agriculture in the First Plan was on schemes aimed at increasing production. The proportion declined to 50% in the second. Food production thus received the lowest priority in the second plan.

Even so, food grains produc­tion registered an increase of 15.17 million tons against the target of 15.75 million tons. However, imports also jumped up from a mere 0.71 million tons in 1955 to 5.14 million tons in 1960. This was interpreted as meaning a growing shortage in the country.

The Ford Foundation Team, therefore, recommended a target of 110 million tons by tripling the then rate of growth of agricultural production. The Third Plan, however, believed that “success in increasing the production of commercial crops is as vital as increase in production of food grains,” and set a target of 100 million tons only. Even this modest target was not achieved.

True, weather was unfavorable in four out of the five years of the plan but climatic factors alone were not responsible for the failure. The draft outline of the Fourth Plan put the production potential created at the end of the Third Plan at only 90 million tons which means that even if crop conditions had been normal, there would have been a shortfall of 10 million tons.

As things turned out, the actual shortfall was to the tune of 28 million tons. A more telling com­mentary on the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of food production programmes cannot be given.

Mention may also be made of the policy of fixing minimum support prices for agricultural commodities which had been continued from June 1957. These prices were expected to serve as a long-term guarantee to producers so that they could persue their efforts with the assurance that any glut in the market, caused by excess of supply over demand, would not depress their incomes.

The appointment of the Agricultural Prices Commission in January, 1965, to advise “on the price policy of agricultural commodities, with a view to evolving a balanced and integrated price structure in the perspective of the over-all needs of the economy and with due regard to the interest of the producer and the consumer,” marked the beginning of a new phase in the evolution of agricultural price policy in India.

It was only now that the whole system of agricultural prices began to be viewed in a broader perspective though we were still very far from evolving a comprehensive, well-integrated price policy.


Essay # 4. Food Production and Imports:

As domestic efforts at increasing food production failed to meet the rising demand, the govt. made up the deficiency through imports which rose rapidly from the annual average of 1.7 million tons during 1952—56, to 3.8 million tons during 1957—61 and 6.5 million tons in 1962—66. Their average value also rose from Rs. 86.72 crores a year in 1952—56 to Rs. 280.8 crores during 1962—66.

The absorption of PL 480 imports was made possible by keeping prices of grains artificially low to consumers. This was particularly true of wheat whose prices, after imports began to flow in freely, remained unduly depressed. This served as a disincentive to food grains production in the country as cultivators began to shift from food to commercial crops.

This may be seen from the fact that, at the time food aid began to flow in, share of imports in the total estimated supplies of food grains in the country was 1.6%; in 1966, the same had risen to 14.1%. Imports thus took us farther from our goal of attaining national self-sufficiency.


Essay # 5. State Trading of Food Grains:

The twists and turns which food grain prices underwent at the hands of middlemen often threatened to ruin the very basis of planned development in India. The seriousness of the problem was appreciated by the Food Grains Policy Committee (1957) which recommended that “our policy should be … that of progressive and planned socialisation of the wholesale trade in food grains”.

How­ever, in view of the difficulties of storage, handling, transport and finance, the committee suggested that “for the present it should be sufficient to undertake open-market purchase and sale of food grains by the govt. as a regular measure, socialize part of the wholesale trade, exercise control over traders… through a system of licensing, and maintain a sizeable reserve stock of wheat and rice…”.

State trading was introduced in 1958—59 but, due to cornering of food stocks by private traders, market arrivals showed a steep fall. Prices, therefore, ruled above the statutory limits laid down by the govt. and quantities procured declined sharply. Thus, within a year of its coming into operation, the whole scheme of state trading collapsed.

It was not revived till 1965 when it was brought back in the form of the Food Corporation of India. The Corporation is a Govt. agency for purchase, storage and Transport of food grains and is no substitute for state-trading.

State trading was not given a fair trial. It was introduced without first building adequate food stocks. On the distribution side, it was reduced to running fair price shops through which imported food grains were distributed at concessional rate. Procurement and purchase were largely neglected.

The principal cause of our failure to solve the food problem was the lack of a set goal in food policy. True, attainment of self-sufficiency was often proclaimed as the national goal. If only the govt. had perused it with single-minded devotion, the problem would have been solved sooner than later.

But the Govt. adopted the easy expedient of foreign help and the aim was washed away by the flood waters of PL 480 imports. Left behind were only “adhoc measures designed to prevent starvation in the immediate present but unconcerned with the aim of national self-sufficiency.”


Essay # 6. Controlling Food Deficit:

So long as overall deficit in food grains persisted and there were possibilities of recurring famines and local scarcities, it was necessary for the Govt. to assume the responsibility of “bringing about equitable distribution of food grains at reasonable prices between different regions and sections of the country.” Food controls thus became unavoidable.

These included:

(a) Division of the country into surplus and deficit zones and prohibiting exports from one zone to another except on Govt. to Govt. basis;

(b) Procurement of surplus grains by the Govt. of her agencies;

(c) Licensing of dealers engaged in the purchase, sale or storage of food grains and requiring them to submit periodical reports;

(d) Introduction of measures to curb hoarding and black-marketing, including the enforcement of selective credit controls and the fixation of maximum controlled prices, and

(e) Introduction of statutory rationing.

Food controls, first introduced in the wake of the Second World War and the Bengal Famine, had continued, with short breaks ever since. In the wake of the Chinese aggression in October 1962, it was feared that prices of some com­modities would rise due to scarcity and profiteering. In order to meet such a situation, the govt. assumed powers to control stocks of commodities and regulate distribution of available supplies.

To begin with, the Govt. confined itself to licensing the wholesalers in grains, rice and flour mills, increasing the number of fair price shops and consumer cooperative stores. As conditions deteriorated further in 1965, statutory rationing was introduced in Calcutta, Madras, Coimbatore, Delhi, Kanpur and Bombay. Later, it was decided to introduce it in all towns with a population of one lakh and above.

The idea behind dividing the country into different zones was to match deficit states with surplus ones so that they could be converted into self-sufficient units. Movement of cereals within a zone was permitted but movement outside was undertaken on Govt. account.

This policy, besides achieving regional self- suf­ficiency, was expected to conserve supplies for local use, to facilitate procurement by the govt. and check speculative rise in prices and profiteering.

As the Agricul­tural Prices Commission observes, it “ensures that whatever is moved from surplus to deficit states would be made available to the consumer in a planned manner and at reasonable rates.”

The system, however, failed to work in years of scarcity because the surplus states under-stated their surplus while the deficit ones exaggerated their shortage and demanded larger supplies from the centre. As a consequence, food deficit in the country was inflated making a bad situation worse.

The basic logic of the policy of public distribution of food-grains implied that the quantity desired to be distributed must be procured from the producer. Procurement thus became a crucial element in the govt’s food policy.

The Pattern of procurement varied from time to time and from state to state … ranging all the way from acreage-levy on producers, levy on millers and dealers to open-market purchases and monopoly procurement at controlled prices.

Procurement efforts were made by all the states except Mysore where it was given up early in 1966. The Principal failure of food policy of the country lies in the inability of the govt. to procure the required food grains from domestic sources. Between 1951—66, procurement in no year exceeded even 8% of the annual production. Nor was it even once equal to the total issue through the public distribution system.

At first this failure was attributed to the production being insufficient. The real reason, however, was that the govt., afraid of alienating the sympathies of the big farmers who dominated the countryside, did not enforce procurement with vigour and determination.

This may be seen from the fact that in 1956 when out-put stood at 60.5 million tons, procurement amounted to a mere 0.1% of the total output. Ten years later in 1966, when production stood at 63 million tons, procure­ment rose to 6.4%.